SAIM2060 - Interest: case law
Case law on the meaning of interest
The definition of interest has been the subject of much judicial
interpretation over the years. In Westminster Bank Ltd v. Riches
(28TC159), Lord Wright observed
“...the essence of interest is that it
is a payment which becomes due because the creditor has not had his
money at the due date. It may be regarded either as representing
the profit he might have made if he had had the use of the money,
or, conversely the loss he suffered because he had not had that
use. The general idea is that he is entitled to compensation for
the deprivation.”
The leading case on the meaning of ‘interest of
money’ is now Re Euro Ltd Hotel (Belgravia) Ltd (51TC293). In
that case, Megarry J considered that in general the case-law showed
there were two requirements which had to be satisfied for a payment
to amount to interest
- there must be a sum of money by reference to which the payment which is said to be interest is to be ascertained – a payment cannot be ‘interest of money' unless there is the requisite ‘money' for the payment to be said to be ‘interest of';
- those sums of money must be due to the person entitled to the alleged interest.
He did not suggest that the two requirements are exhaustive or inescapable but that in the ordinary case they sufficed.
What is interest is a question of substance
What constitutes interest is a question of legal substance, not
terminology. In the Westminster Bank case Lord Wright said its
‘essential quality…depends on substance not on the mere
name’. Lord Simonds, with Lord Porter concurring, said that
what needed to be considered was ‘what is its intrinsic
character’.
That substantive test was reaffirmed in Re Euro Hotel
(Belgravia) Ltd, in which by Megarry J said
“It has, quite rightly, not been
suggested that the language used by the parties to an instrument in
describing payments to be made under it can bind the Inland
Revenue, or affect the operation of a statute. The question must
always be one of the true nature of the payment.”
The contract in that case was one in which it was provided
that one party would ‘pay to the Bank interest’. It was
held that what was paid was not ‘interest of money' despite
the wording of the contract quoted above, because the Bank in
question had not advanced money as a loan, but instead as out and
out non-returnable payments for building works. The
‘interest' was not ‘interest of money'.
‘Single indivisible sums’
Another important case on the nature of interest is Chevron
Petroleum (UK) Ltd, & Others v. BP Petroleum Development Ltd
& Others Ltd (57TC137). Payments between the companies included
‘an interest factor' and were calculated in accordance with a
complex formula. BP made the payments to Chevron after deducting
income tax from the interest factors. The point at issue was
whether the payments were true interest. Lord Justice Megarry's
view was that the ‘interest factor' was, in law,
‘interest of money' and that because of the substantive
nature of the test the Court would, if necessary, dissect lump-sum
payments into interest of money and other sums. He said
“If in its nature a sum is
‘interest of money', I think it retains that nature even if
the parties to a contract provide for it to be wrapped up with some
other sum and the whole paid in the form of a single indivisible
sum. The wrappings may conceal the nature of the contents but they
do not alter them. Were the law otherwise, strong contractual
wrappings might become remarkably popular.”
