OT05820 - PRT: Terminal Liftings - Background
There are many instances in the UK or on the UK Continental
Shelf where oil from different fields is blended, be it on a
platform, in a pipeline system, or at an onshore terminal. At some
point this blended stream will be loaded on to tankers (or more
rarely pipeline delivered) and sold by the producers as a single
standardised product. These blends can range from the large widely
traded ones such as Forties and Brent down to two-field blends with
one or two cargoes loading per chargeable period.
Commingling agreements between the various blend
participators determine how much of a month’s blend
production is attributable to each originating field (using
hydrocarbon accounting to account for the quality differentials of
the oil produced from different fields). S.63 FA 1987 requires LBS
Oil & Gas approval that all the terms of these commingling
agreements are acceptable for the purposes of PRT. If not then
different terms may be imposed for tax purposes only. See
OT05601 for more.
Field joint venture agreements determine how this production
is then allocated between the field participants at any time.
If all of a company's oil production in the blend for a month
was loaded on to one tanker every month the above agreements would
be sufficient for PRT purposes to determine the field source of the
blended oil. However some companies have sufficient production to
entitle them to more than one lifting of a blend in a month. Also
onshore terminals and some offshore blended oil installations have
storage facilities whereby all the oil produced from the fields
making up the blend may not actually be loaded on to tankers as it
is delivered to the loading facility.
Therefore these agreements are not sufficient to provide a
neutral determination of the field source (and quantities) in
respect of a company’s lifting of oil in a blend.
At some of these loading facilities the operator will
determine how a participator’s liftings in a particular month
are allocated across its field interests. The allocation basis
being based upon the participator’s actual or estimated share
of available blended oil (opening stock and production) in the
month in question. However the lifting agreements at most of the
larger facilities (and some others) allow the producer a large
degree of discretion over how a particular lifting of oil is
allocated between its field interests. This means that a producer
can assign more of a lifting to a field than its share of available
blend production would merit (overlift) or assign less (underlift).
The lifting agreements will contain parameters to ensure that a
company’s field interest does not become too over- or
under-lifted. But within these constraints the producer normally
has unfettered flexibility over how to allocate liftings to its
fields.
This flexibility to assign liftings to certain field
interests gave certain companies, who chose to do so, the
opportunity to assign high value sales of the blend to their field
interests that did not pay PRT (new fields and those whose profits
were covered by allowances) and lower values ones to the PRT-paying
fields thus reducing their PRT exposure.
A further tax mitigation opportunity was available to the
large producers in a blend from purchasing of parcels of that blend
from smaller producers under ‘period of entitlement’
term contracts. These contracts allow the purchaser to acquire the
seller’s oil production from one or more of its field
interests for a certain period (usually either 6 months or a year)
in a blend in return for regular payments based upon the
seller’s estimated monthly production entitlement from the
field interests covered by the contract. There is usually a cash
adjustment at the end of the contract period to reflect actual
production against the estimates used in determining the payment
schedule.
The purchaser normally has discretion over when the oil under
the contract is actually lifted (subject to facility lifting
agreement constraints). This discretion allowed the purchaser to
lift this oil to satisfy its higher priced sales contracts in the
blend thus leaving its own production available to satisfy its
lower priced sales contracts.
Research undertaken by LBS Oil & Gas confirmed that a
number of companies (though not all) with the scope to exploit
these opportunities were doing so. This resulted in both a reduced
PRT take, and afforded these companies an unfair competitive
advantage over other companies.
Therefore the attribution rules were introduced to codify how
liftings of blended oil are allocated between a company’s
field interests in the blend.
