INTM208230 - Controlled Foreign Companies: exemptions - the motive test
Application of motive test: holding companies - 21 March 2000 example
This example stated that:
'the current exemption distorts the way some overseas investments are structured, and is leading to a loss of United Kingdom tax. For instance, a United Kingdom company wanting to put additional funds into a subsidiary in the United States will commonly borrow in the United Kingdom, put the borrowed money into a low tax subsidiary (e.g. in the International Financial Services Centre in Dublin Docks) in the form of share capital, and the low tax subsidiary will then lend the money to the United States. In this example, the tax effect would be:
- a tax deduction at 30% in the United Kingdom (for the interest on the United Kingdom loan)
- a tax deduction at 34% in the US (for the interest on the loan from Dublin Docks)
- a tax charge at 10% in Dublin Docks (on the interest from the US).
In other words, the group would get 2 lots of deduction at normal tax rates, and a single charge at a low rate.'
A number of companies have suggested that this demonstrates that
the policy behind the change to the exempt activities test and the
withdrawal of the 'staging post' interpretation of the motive test
was to tackle these so-called 'double dips' (i.e. the achievement
of a tax deduction in two countries for what is, in effect, the
same interest payment). As such, some companies believe that the
motive test should continue to apply to controlled foreign
companies that are not being used to achieve a 'double dip'.
This is not so. Clearly 'double dips' were (and are) a
concern but, as is evident from the preceding explanation of how
the motive test works, only one element of this kind of 'double
dip' (the sheltering of the interest receipt) has any relevance to
the motive test. The 'double dip' example was simply an
illustration of the avoidance United Kingdom groups had begun to
indulge in post- ACT since it reduced tax on two fronts - the
United Kingdom interest deduction (irrelevant to the motive test
unless the borrowing in the United Kingdom is from the controlled
foreign company) and the diversion of the interest receipt (central
to the motive test).
It does not matter, in the context of the motive test, if the
structure is used to achieve a 'double dip'. All that matters is
whether one of the main reasons for the existence of the controlled
foreign company is to achieve a reduction in United Kingdom tax by
a diversion of profits from the United Kingdom as defined in
ICTA88/SCH25/PARA19.
