Whether the Social Security Contributions (Intermediaries) Regulations 2000 and Schedule 12 FA 2000 applied to the provision of services by an IT consultant working through his own service company.
The salient facts of the case were as follows:
The Inspector had made a decision under section 8 of the Social
Security Contributions (Transfer of Functions, etc) Act 1999 in
respect of regulation 6 of the Social Security Contributions
(Intermediaries) Regulations 2000. The decision covered the period
1 June 2000 to 30 March 2001.
The Inspector had also made a determination under Regulation
49 of the Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1993 in respect of
FA2000/SCH12 for the year ended 5 April 2001 in respect of a deemed
Schedule E payment.
Appeals were made and they were dismissed by the Special
Commissioner.
An appeal was made to the High Court and was limited to two
grounds:
The Usetech/NES Terms and Conditions were part of a standard
contract, which NES used when engaging individuals through one-man
companies like Usetech. It contained a provision relating to
substitution but this was not reflected in the ABB/NES contract
The Special Commissioner had said in his decision that
‘the “right” of substitution was largely
illusory’. Park J. thought there was a prior question that
ought to have been asked and that was whether there would have been
any right of substitution at all in the notional contract between
ABB and Mr Hood. He concluded that, in accordance with the facts
found by the Special Commissioner, the hypothetical contract would
not have contained a substitution provision. There
was no substitution provision in the ABB/NES contract and there was
no evidence to suggest that Usetech had even tried to have such a
provision inserted in that contract. Additionally, the facts
indicated that in reality ABB required Mr Hood’s services.
The judge went a stage further and said that even if Mr Hood
had raised in negotiation with ABB the possibility of a
substitution provision, he considered that ABB would not have
agreed to it. Had Mr Hood been unable to provide his services and
suggested a replacement, the evidence of Mr Hunter was that ABB
would have given some weight to that suggestion. But he added:
“That, however, is a far cry from the direct contract between Mr Hood and ABB containing an express provision which conferred on him an entitlement to substitute someone else for himself, subject only to the substitute having the required skills.”
Counsel for the appellant had also argued that as Mr Hood only
had access to the Usetech/NES contract, which contained a
substitution clause, and was not aware that there was no
corresponding clause in the ABB/NES contract, the hypothetical
contract must have contained such a clause. He also said that this
argument was reinforced by the self-assessment nature of the tax
system. The judge rejected those arguments relying in part on the
judgment of Burton J. in R (on the application of the PCG and
others) v IRC [2001] STC 629 at p.651.
For all those reasons, the judge did not accept that the
hypothetical contract would have contained a substitution clause.
He then went on to consider previous court decisions on
substitution clauses at clauses 48 to 54 of his judgment and this
provides a useful summary of this subject. Importantly he says at
clause 53:
“The presence of a substitution clause is an indicium which points to self- employment, and if the clause is as far-reaching as the one in Tanton it may be determinative by itself.”
The minimum that ABB had to provide and pay for under its
contract with NES was 37.5 hours. Additionally, it “was
underpinned by a provision that seven days notice had to be given
by either party to terminate the contract.” The judge
concluded that the hypothetical contract between ABB and Mr Hood
would have contained such provisions and on that basis the
mutuality requirement would be satisfied.
The appeal was therefore dismissed.