ESM0535 - Guide to determining status: is the right of substitution genuine
The right, as opposed to the obligation, to provide a substitute
is a pointer towards self-employment and if it is unqualified it is
probable that the courts would consider it to be a strong pointer
to self-employment or determinative of self-employment by itself.
However, a right to send a substitute must be genuine for it
to be taken into account at all in deciding employment status.
Where the true agreement between the parties is that the worker
must undertake the work personally but a written contractual term
allowing substitution exists the written clause will be ignored as
a ‘sham’. Lord Justice Gibson made this clear in the
case of Express and Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton (see
ESM7210) where he said
’Of course it is important that the Industrial Tribunal should be alert in this area of the law to look at the reality of any obligations. If the obligation is a sham it will want to say so.’
This applies equally to other tribunals determining status, such
as General or Special Commissioners. You should adopt a similar
approach and be alert to the possibility that a written contractual
term may be a sham. Likewise, where there is an oral contract you
need to be alert to the possibility that an alleged right of
substitution may not be genuine.
More detailed guidance on ‘sham’ in the
employment status context is provided at ESM1003 onwards. Those
instructions explain that the Commissioners and Courts will accept
a written contractual clause unless they have evidence that it does
not represent the true agreement between the parties. This means
that if we are to dispute such a clause the onus is on us to
demonstrate that it is a sham (or has been varied by an agreement
subsequent to the contract being signed).
As explained above it is the right of substitution that is
important. The fact that substitution has not actually occurred
during a contract is not necessarily relevant. Workers with such a
right are of course entirely free to carry out the work themselves
if they wish. We may want to consider claims that there is a right
of substitution critically if substitution does not occur over a
long period of time. However, we should not automatically assume,
in such cases, that this means that there is no real right of
substitution.
A house builder might want a bricklayer to lay all the
bricks on a particular plot and agree to pay the worker engaged a
specific sum to carry out the work – with payment being made
only on satisfactory completion of the task. In such a situation
the engager may have little interest in who carries out the work
(payment will only be made for satisfactory work). A contract,
which allowed for substitution in such a case, would not be
surprising. On the other hand, the same builder may want to ensure
the bricklaying (for example, for show homes or a specific one off
project) is to an extremely high standard and may want to hire a
particular bricklayer whose skills are known to carry out the
work.
